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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The weak democratic systems that followed decades of
military dictatorships in Latin America coupled with the
emergence of new authoritarian regimes of the left have had
a significant impact on the relationship between the
governments and the media. The new populist leaders have
challenged the media that have generally reflected the
perspectives of the traditional elites. This ideological clash
has renewed direct and indirect censorship, curtailing
freedom of expression and thus, freedom of the press.
In this context, this paper discusses the mechanisms used by
Latin American governments, particularly the new
authoritarianism of the left, to silence dissident voices.
Many of these mechanisms are legal, found in laws related to
personal injury and defamation. Others have been of a
constitutional nature, invoking states of emergency or
national security concerns. Some governments have used
institutional means to close down newspapers and other
sources of information.
Current media conditions in Latin America show growing
polarization. This has led to considerable levels of violence
and intimidation against editors, journalists, and news crews
in several countries. It is precisely this type of deterioration
of fundamental rights that leads to questioning the strength
and sustainability of Latin American democracies.
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INTRODUCTION
Latin America is undergoing one of the most dramatic
periods in recent history. After decades of dictatorship,
turbulent economic crisis and the emergence of new actors in
the political scene, the region‘s democracies are still far from
consolidated. A report from the United Nations Development
Program suggests that democracy in the region has failed to
live up to the expectations of millions in the region.1 To
make matters worse, the military arguably continue to hold
influence among democratically-elected governments across
the region,2 while the legitimacy of traditional democratic
institutions have eroded over the past few years, limiting
their ability to deploy authority and mobilize the public
towards common goals of society. This is truer in the case of
traditional political parties, which have lost important ground
among their constituencies; making voters far more
pragmatic in their choices.3 This pragmatism and the
unresolved issue of socio-economic disparities have
facilitated the emergence of populist leaders who stand for
wealth re-distribution while challenging traditional elites.
Indeed, the end of the 1990s witnessed the rise of left-wing
governments in Latin America. Hugo Chávez in Venezuela,
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in Brazil, Néstor Kirchner in
Argentina, -- Correa in Ecuador, and Evo Morales in Bolivia
were prominent among those who swept into power in this
scenario of anti-politics.
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It is in this context that the media has played an increasingly
important role in defending the former status of power. From
the start, the newly elected left-wing leaders encountered a
media landscape where ownership was highly concentrated
in a few hands and where the mainstream and privatelyowned commercial media exerted a forceful opposition
towards governments and policies aimed at promoting wealth
re-distribution. Evidence of this can be seen in the active role
played by the news media in the rapid overthrow of President
Hugo Chavez in April 20024 and the subsequent antagonistic
relations with the governments of Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia,
Ecuador and Nicaragua, among others.
In return, governments have responded by enacting and
modifying legislation regarding news media ownership. In
some cases, these governments have gone as far as
nationalizing existing media outlets while creating new ones
in order to challenge prevalent accounts of events while
counter-mobilizing public opinion. Still in others, there have
been direct intimidation and attacks against the media. In
Honduras, for example, there are reports of more than 300
documented attacks against the media in 2009. It is within
these scenarios of confrontational and polarized politics that
censorship, self-censorship, pressures and threats against
journalists have become once again rife across Latin
America.
This article examines the current threats and challenges
polarization poses for the democratic stability of the
4

Jairo Lugo & Juan Romero, ―From friends to foes: Venezuela‘s media
goes from consensual space to confrontational actor.‖ Sincronía. (Spring
2003) Vol. 4, No. 2.
http://sincronia.cucsh.udg.mx/lugoromeroinv02.htm (Accessed in
November 12, 2009).

3

continent. As these governments face up limitations of power
in their ability to satisfy the demands for a better allocation
of resources; confrontation and polarization between these
governments and the commercially owned media are
expected to grow stronger. The reaction from these
governments to the threats posed by the media has in some
cases already undertaken semi-authoritarian positions; which
are unique to left-wing governments in the region.
BACK TO THE FUTURE
Thirty years ago only a handful of countries in Latin America
had democratic regimes in which different political parties
alternated into power.5 Today, all countries —with the
exception of Cuba— have some sort of a multi-party
electoral system. Official censors from the past military
regimes have been formally removed from the newsrooms
across the region and most of the new constitutions in these
countries explicitly guarantee freedom of speech. However,
democracy has brought different degrees of tolerance
towards the role of the media and the work of journalists. In
many cases the newly found freedom of the media has come
with strings attached; meaning formal and informal
mechanisms of control.
Formal constrains on the media have included not only laws
and regulations that date back to the fall of the military
regimes, but also recent legislation on media ownership,
access to broadcast airwaves, and proposed discretionary
powers to regulate what people may or may not see from
satellite channels and the Internet. Mechanisms of informal
5

Dante Caputo, ―Los debates prohibidos de América Latina,‖ Project
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control include indirect censorship and self-censorship,
which became more explicit and widely used by left-wing
leaders in the late 1990‘s, especially after realizing that the
privately owned commercial media was being used to
mobilize the public against the re-distributive agendas of
these governments. However, it is not these mechanisms of
control that hinders the ability of the news media and
journalists to express their views freely, but instead the
profound polarization of political and ideological views
derived from the confrontation for the control of resources.
In doing so, pro-government and anti-government media
outlets have become a praetorian guard of the main interests
they represent and have effectively blocked not only opposite
views, but those that represent alternatives to both sides. The
result is a false dichotomy in which neither side admits
criticism, nor values the democratic debate and political
plurality.
THE MEDIA IN TRANSITION
In most cases, the media outlets in Latin America went from
being a subordinate appendix of the military dictatorships,
constrained by direct censorship, to become quasiautonomous agents of political control during democracy, in
its way serving the interest of the new ruling elites. Since
then, they have participated ―in the transaction of power
while structuring the political positions of the different
agents.‖6 It was a scheme in which media outlets were
allowed to act as watchdogs but within a set of boundaries,
which included institutional support for liberal democracy

6
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and informal arrangements with the political and economic
elites.7
If indeed the constitutional framework did guarantee freedom
of expression, it did so under specific limits established by
law. These limits included harsh anti-defamation laws and
severe restrictions to what could be covered by news crews.
Among them, the case of the temporary suspension of
constitutional guarantees by the executive branch, when
declaring states of emergency or invoking national security
concerns as a way of imposing a de facto injunction over
what could be published or broadcast. Overall, democratic
governments are not exempt of committing these sins. Most
of them, with a few exceptions, have exercised, in one way
or another, censorship. Furthermore, Colombia, Guatemala,
Honduras, Mexico and Peru have a terrible track record of
human rights abuses against editors and journalists, as well
as impunity of the perpetrators. Forcible disappearance and
assassination of news casts is still common in the region.
Other indirect means of censorship include: libel actions
against media outlets and journalists; direct violence against
them; and, practices of self-censorship among editors and
news media owners due to intimidation or financial pressure.
More recently, editors and journalists have been persecuted
and imprisoned using a string of supposedly unrelated
accusations that go from alleged embezzlement ―as in the
case of Eladio Muchacho from Diario de Los Andes in
Venezuela― to accusations of illegal adoption of children
from those forcibly disappeared during the military juntas
―as in the case of Marcela and Felipe Noble Herrera ―coowners of El Clarin in Argentina.
7
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Other types of constraints derive from economic pressures.
On the one hand, media ownership in the region is not only
highly concentrated but closely linked to traditional political
and economic elites with renewed corporative interests.
Journalists in places such as Uruguay and Costa Rica have
often bowed to pressures from media owners who usually
indicate what can or cannot be reported. On the other hand,
the State is still a key element with regards to media reform8
and funding, as it provides a substantial amount of
advertising revenue. Within these boundaries for media
freedom, journalists and news media in general could
criticize governments and politicians and carry out
investigative reporting, while producing media campaigns in
favor or against topical issues. These boundaries, however,
rarely allow for the coverage of inequality as a news topic; at
least not in a systematic manner.
A SECOND TRANSITION
The arrival of new left-wing leaders to power marked the
beginning of a profound transformation of the relationship
between the media and the government. The mainstream
media rapidly became not only a confrontational actor, but a
major antagonist player able to organize, agglutinate and
mobilize the opposition.9 In many ways the 2002 brief
overthrow of Chávez was ―a mediated coup,‖10 which
brought extraordinary consequences to the future of the
private media-government relations, not only in Venezuela
but also across the continent. As some have suggested, ―The
8
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private mainstream media still owes the Venezuelan society a
good explanation about their reprehensible behavior during
those years.‖11
Since then, the Venezuelan government has been far more
aggressive in pushing its own media agenda, promoting
community broadcast media to resist the growing criticism of
private media sectors, while accelerating the introduction of
a new legislation on broadcast that gives the government
more discretionary power and control over it. As a result, the
Ley de Responsabilidad Social en Radio y Televisión
―approved on December 2004― has been fundamental to
dissuade most of the broadcast media of taking a critical
stance. This was achieved through the enforcement of a hard
set of sanctions ―from heavy fines to revocation of
licenses― that have been applied over 200 radio and
television stations. Since then, experts and non-governmental
organizations have agreed that this legislation has been
effective in bringing out self-censorship.12
Another important measure taken by the Venezuelan
administration was the decision to take off the air the
terrestrial signal of Radio Caracas Televisión (RCTV) ―one
of the two main Venezuelan television networks. To some,
this responded to a premeditated strategy by the government
11

A. Cañizález, ―Tiempos de revolución: protagonismo y polarización
mediáticas en Venezuela,‖ in A. Cañizález, (Coordinador) Tiempos de
cambio. Política y comunicación en América Latina (Caracas:
Universidad Católica Andrés Bello y Fundación Konrad Adenauer,
2009), 67-68.
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of President Hugo Chávez to replace the hegemony of
private broadcasters with a state-dominated and a stateinfluenced media.13 A study performed by Bernardino
Herrera ―from the Instituto de Investigaciones de la
Comunicación of the Universidad Central de Venezuela
(ININCO-UCV) ― suggests that 70 percent of the programs
aired by the main state-owned television network (VTV) and
TEVES (which took over the airwaves from RCTV)
contained pro-government propaganda, biased information,
and repetitions of President Chávez‘s addresses in television
and radio.14
The steps taken by the Venezuelan government were quickly
followed by Argentina, Bolivia and Ecuador, where there
were clear ideological links to Venezuela. However, soon
after, similar types of legislation appeared in Mexico and
Honduras. Right after the coup, tensions between the
government of Honduras and the media outlets were also
very high. A draconian anti-terrorist law ―which severely
undermined freedom of speech― was passed by Congress
behind closed doors in a session to which news media were
denied access. Indeed, the use of legislative powers to
undermine the ability of the media to provide critical
reporting has become a widespread governmental practice in
many countries.
When Ecuador declared a state of emergency on September
2010, as protests by police and some members of the military
13

C. Lauría, ―Chávez Does No Such Thing: Press Freedom Conditions
Have Seriously Deteriorated Under His Regime,‖ Television Quarterly,
(2008) Vol. XXXVIII, No. 1, p. 18.
14
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2008) 69.

9

led to nationwide unrest, the accusations of a coup d'état
came from the government. Critics of President Rafael
Correa, however, said he had exaggerated by calling it a coup
attempt. Rubén Darío Buitrón, news editor of El Comercio,
the leading Quito newspaper, said that no coup was under
way and that the government was spinning the protests in
order to gain political support.
It is a media show and things have been
exaggerated by the government in order to
make it look like a victim," he said, adding that
the problems had originated from low-ranking
officers, not from any group of military
generals wishing to take control.15
According to a study from the NGO Fundamedios in
Ecuador, between 2007 and 2011, the government filed more
than 18 lawsuits against media editors and journalists. This
could potentially pose a liability of millions of US dollars
and lead to the bankruptcy of many of the mainstream media
outlets. There is a well-documented case of journalists Juan
Carlos Calderón and Christian Zurita, who were sued by
President Correa for over US$10 million dollars for their
book ―El Gran Hermano,‖ (The Great Brother) which alleged
links of President Correa‘s brother with private corporations
that were undertaking government contracts. Other cases
include those of journalists Emilio Palacio, Francisco
Vivanco and José Acacho, all of whom have been threatened
with prison sentences and large civil suits.
15

Mercedes Alvarado and Roberto Kozak, ―Ecuador Calls State of
Emergency,‖ The Wall Street Journal. 30 September 2010.
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41308454.html. Accessed on 12 May 2011.
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In Bolivia, political events have led to the promotion of new
legislation that limits the ability of journalists and the media
to cover certain issues. Indeed, fears of separatist movements
have led to greater control of the media, while a new and
wide supported anti-racist legislation has included articles
that grant discretionary powers to the government while
posing a potential threat against the freedom of the media.
Opposition leaders and some of the mainstream media outlets
of Santa Cruz and Cochabamba ―regions rich in natural
resources― have been accused of promoting national
separatism with the intention of weakening President Evo
Morales‘ government. Indeed, separatism in Bolivia has
often been associated with white and rich land ownership, as
in the case of the US-born rancher Ronald Larsen, who has
openly opposed the Morales' administration. Followers of
President Morales have accused the media of supporting
these movements and of putting in jeopardy the national
unity.
Equally critical has been the proposal for a new law on
racism. The Episcopal Conference of the Catholic Church in
Bolivia (CEB) warned that if changes were not made to the
draft law against racism, led by President Morales, there
could be a serious danger of undermining freedom of
expression. The Secretary General of the CEB, Oscar
Aparicio, pointed out that if some of the passages in this
project remain in the final bill, democratic exercise of
freedom of expression could disappear altogether. These
parts of the bill have also been rejected by several institutions
such as the media associations, federations, and unions of
journalists in that country. The law provides economic
sanctions and authorizes the Executive branch to close any
media that publishes or broadcasts any content considered
racist or discriminatory. Needless to say that the wording is
11

in some cases is vague and left to discretionary interpretation
by the authorities.
It is possible to suggest that some of these governments are
using perfectly legitimate causes to push for media laws that
limit ―or could potentially limit― the freedom of
expression as they provide wider discretionary powers to the
Executive ―making it more difficult for journalists and
media owners to challenge the former. In Nicaragua, for
instance, the Congress passed a bill that criminalized
violence against women and established sanctions against
media that satirized female politicians. This has effectively
kept some cartoonists from drawing and criticizing the first
lady.
DECONSTRUCTING POLARIZED VIOLENCE
Another key exercise of indirect censorship is the
orchestrated violence against media in general, particularly
journalists and news workers. According to the Venezuelan
NGO Espacio Público, in 2008 there were 186 cases of
violations affecting journalists and media outlets, mostly
assaults, intimidation, and threats; one journalist was killed.
In 2009, another NGO, the Instituto Prensa y Sociedad,
reported two journalists killed, about 20 harmed, and more
than 200 cases of aggressions against reporters, between
print and broadcast media outlets in Venezuela alone. In
other places such as Colombia and Mexico, journalism has
become indeed one of the most dangerous and deadly
professions. However, violence also extends to the media
outlet itself. In 2002 the main offices of El Nacional were
surrounded by pro-government sympathizers, minutes after

12

President Chávez had made harsh critics on national
television against the newspaper.16
Also, there have been several violent acts against television
networks such as Globovision. Explosive devices have been
thrown at the station in daylight and many reporters and
photographers have been attacked by pro-government
supporters as well as by both the police and the armed forces.
Indeed, it is the State‘s responsibility to control violence and
guarantee the safety of journalists, even if the attacks come
from third parties.
Violence, however, has not been an exclusive issue of progovernment sectors. Many in the opposition in Venezuela
have orchestrated violence against pro-government media
and media workers, while trying to cover news from the
opposition. This situation has been replicated in places such
as Bolivia and Ecuador, but to a much lesser extent. Some
authors believe that there are structural reasons as to why
violence against journalists and news crews is becoming
endemic. They point out that this is a reflection upon the
fragility of democracy in some Latin American countries,
which translates into increasing violence against press
workers.17 Colombia alone has the macabre Latin America‘s
record of more journalists killed in the continent,18 while
16

A. Cañizález, ―La era Chávez: notas para una historia política del
periodismo venezolano,‖ in M. Bisbal, Hegemonía y control
comunicacional (Caracas: Editorial Alfa y Universidad Católica Andrés
Bello, 2009) 224.
17
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530.
18
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places such as Mexico follow dead close. Because of this, the
phenomenon of orchestrated and spontaneous violence
against reporters and news teams needs to be analyzed in a
wider setting that focuses not only on how the news are
controlled and censored, but also on how impunity affects
media freedom.
Previous research carried out in other societies suggests that
when journalists‘ safety is seriously compromised, news
crews either stop or limit their coverage.19 If the need of
coverage relates to political or economic interests of the
media organizations, and if these interests are greater than
the risk of getting journalists killed or harmed, journalists
and news crews have to become ‗embedded‘ with one of the
parts; despite the detriment of their ability to be critical and
independent.
This is exactly what is happening in Colombia, Ecuador and
Venezuela, where journalists and their news crews remain
behind friendly lines in order to guarantee their own safety.
By doing so, journalists and reporters become embedded in
each side of the political spectrum, therefore reinforcing
prevalent views within their core audiences. This only
increases polarization, while making normal mechanisms of
self criticism and dialogue dysfunctional.
It is true that media polarization in Latin America is not a
new phenomenon. Historically newspapers and broadcasters
were divided between pro-government and pro-opposition
media, with little or no space whatsoever for alternative
views. Even during the 1930s and the 1940s, the newspapers
of the time did not publish the names of the candidates that
19

Greg McLauglin, The War Correspondent (London: Pluto Press, 2002)
98.
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did not represent their interests.20 Indeed, as some argue,
polarization has been a sustained trend and feature of modern
Latin America.21
However, what it is relatively new is the degree of violent
confrontation and exclusion within this process of
polarization. In 2007, a report from the Human Rights Watch
(HRW) in Venezuela identified 47 aggressions against
journalists. In the year 2008, the number of aggressions had
gone to over 60 according to the same report.22 Similar
tendencies can now be found in places such as Bolivia and
Ecuador, where violence against media presents itself in
verbal and physical forms. In places such as Colombia,
Mexico and Peru, violence against journalists and subsequent
impunity of the perpetrators is widespread. Nowadays,
journalists find themselves under the same threats that
judges, prosecutors, union leaders and human rights activists,
but in most cases without the legal or police protection that
some of the former enjoy when carrying out their functions.
Under these circumstances, journalists are compelled to
report only from safe intellectual and physical zones, in order
to reassure their status as gatekeepers of their constituencies.
They know that the fundamental nature of polarization is
violence; which is not only a manifestation of a pre-existing
20
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21
A. Cañizález, ―Tiempos de revolución: protagonismo y polarización
mediáticas en Venezuela,‖ in A. Cañizález, Tiempos de cambio. Política
y comunicación en América Latina (Caracas: Universidad Católica
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22
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antagonism, but a mean to keep that same antagonism in
place ―crucial to reinforce political identity and ideology.
In doing so, subjective violence in face of polarization is
pivotal to manage indirect censorship. A few journalists are
able to reach objectivity despite the heavy baggage and
pressures that sometimes make it almost impossible to
provide a fair account of events.
Journalists from both sides acknowledge the problems they
face when bringing back accounts that do not represent the
mainstream views within their own newsrooms. They say
that it is even more problematic to bring back political stories
that do not fit either views of ―goodies and baddies.‖
According to Gabriela Pedrozo an investigative reporter for
Globovision, for more than a decade,
To work in that network has become a life
experience; now we have to wear a bulletproof
vest to go on the streets. We receive training on
how to use gas masks. Globovision has been
accused by the government of promoting
“media terrorism” and of “poisoning the
minds of the public.23
Pedrozo instead blames the government for the increasing
violence against journalists and underlines the limited access
journalists have to government sources.24 This complaint is

23

López, Jaime, ―Los retos de ser periodista en la Venezuela de Chávez.
Diario El Mundo,‖ January 2, 2010,
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Accessed on August 23, 2010.
24
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also shared by others such as Luis Pérez from La Verdad
Daily in Venezuela:
Not only we do not get invited to press
conferences or events, but moreover if we
manage to get there, we are denied access by
the authorities and security services.25
Pérez‘s views are shared by other journalists working in what
the government supporters describe as ―opposition media
outlets.‖26
The situation seems to have deteriorated in the past ten years.
Traditionally, political leadership had accepted, with
reticence, the democratic and critical role of journalists and
media outlets; viewing news editors and journalists as
political adversaries, who would, nevertheless, play along the
wider ground rules of the system. However, this is no longer
the case in some of the new regimes. The new left-wing
political elites see journalists instead as ideological enemies
who are willing to bring them down from power in what is
perceived to be a class struggle.
Even though certain degree of polarization is healthy for
public debate and confrontation of political ideas, the
polarization of the media in many Latin American countries
has become an end in itself for censorship, which often spills
http://www.elmundo.es/america/2009/12/14/noticias/1260797843.html.
Accessed on January 11, 2010.
25
Phone interview with Luis Pérez on August 27, 2011.
26
AnTV Noticias, ―Cilia Flores: Medios de oposición montaron pote de
humo,‖ Aporrea.org, September 9, 2008.
http://www.aporrea.org/medios/n120513.html. Accessed on January 5,
2009.
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into violence or threats of violence. Madeline García, who
works for the State-owned international broadcaster TeleSur
and who formally worked with the privately owned Televen
during the events of 2002 in Venezuela, argues that violence
comes from both sides. This position is also supported by
pro-government journalists across the continent. However, it
is the government the ultimate responsible for the security
and well-being of journalists and reporters from all sides.
Peruvian and journalists Carlos Ganoza, argues,
One might even suggest that the current
antagonism between the media and the leftwing governments is a radical manifestation of
a greater framework of polarized politics in
which these countries have been crudely
divided between those who are in favor and
against the new left-wing paradigm. 27
However, audiences are crude social constructions and as
such, they do not entirely reflect the more complex and
interlinked set of realities that define how certain issues will
be covered. Therefore, as news is directed towards these
audiences, they resent the issues as simplistic caricatures that
serve well the ability to hold on to specific audiences by
reinforcing their pre-conceptions and world-views.
POLARIZED DANGERS
The use of indirect mechanisms of censorship is not
exclusive to Latin America or even to the developing
countries. The use of injunctions and threats of libel actions
to keep the media at bay is now widespread in the U.S. and
27

Phone interview with Carlos Ganoza on August 20, 2011.
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Great Britain.28 More recently, a group of young Muslims in
the UK were detained by the police and taken to court under
the Anti-Terrorist Act for showing banners against British
soldiers returning from Afghanistan.29 Paradoxically, the
slogans in the banners were very similar if not almost
identical to those used in the anti-Vietnam war protests and
in the 1960s‘ anti-apartheid movement.
The use of violence against the media, journalists and news
crews is still ―sadly― a recurrent and widely spread
practice in our times. Violence against journalists is
deliberately used by governments to limit their independent
assessment of the events and to push for ―embedded
journalism.‖ Indeed, journalists from both developing
countries and industrialized nations are constantly
threatened, harmed and killed while pursuing their stories
with the sole intention of silencing dissident voices.30
In Latin America, polarization provides a framework that
legitimizes censorship and makes it not only acceptable but
also arguably desirable for the public. Because of
polarization, the public sphere and the elements that nurture a
healthy political debate in Latin America are partitioned in
opposing mirrors that reflect almost unrecognizable
28
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November 17, 2009.
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caricatures of the same events and issues. Indeed, in Latin
America, the media landscape is now dominated either by
official media ―usually used as propaganda in the context of
re-distributive policies― or by corporative media owned by
a few who try to hold on to their traditional privileges. This
dichotomy is expressed in a deeply polarized environment in
which both sides are fervently trying to establish their own
hegemony in airwaves. This has become a common practice
in places such as Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela,
where presidents not only have weekly programs, but also
almost unlimited access to the airwaves.
One of the most worrisome features is that this situation
seems to be widely accepted not only by those who gather
and disseminate the news, but also by the public who
consumes them. Most surveys in the region suggest that with
a few exceptions, those media outlets that adopt impartial
views tend to suffer in terms of ratings and sales.31 Similar
surveys and market research suggest that in some places
polarization has been more accepted as 'normal'. In
Argentina, Bolivia, and Ecuador, the public has become
radicalized in reading, listening and watching only the media
outlets that reflect their own political preferences, since they
seem to provide a legitimate version of events.
Regrettably one must conclude that the formerly held notion
of an impartial and somehow balanced media, even if it is
just a utopian aspiration, has ceased to be the right choice for
many. If one is to believe the media sales figures and ratings
from different media outlets, people in Latin America seem
to want either a completely depoliticized media full of
infotainment or a news media politically charged with
31
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propaganda from either side. It is a dire scenario in which
audiences tend to tune only to what reinforces their own
political identity, or even worse, not to tune anything at all.
Also, the radicals from both sides seem very happy to see
their own political views uncritically reflected in their media
coverage, even if this means omitting facts and censoring
voices that challenge prevalent views. Some authors have
observed how this polarized coverage tends to operate by
providing or undermining legitimacy to the opposing
narratives.
At the core of this system of censorship and self-censorship,
as we have discussed it earlier, extreme polarization
translates into violence. Paraphrasing Žižek32, this is a type
of systemic violence that is not perceivable to many, but
upon which systems of power depend. This violence against
opposite views is virulent, oppressing and blinding, but
equally silent and intangible. It is pure terror ―hence why
many are now using the term ―media terrorism.‖33 In this
framework, the media is vociferous in attacking the ―other‖,
as well as fearful of reflecting self-criticism or perspectives
that do not exhibit those of their political masters.
Behind all this, there is a mechanism to award legitimacy by
polarization. Indeed, by making journalists, editors, news
media and sources take sides and embrace extreme positions,
the framework of polarization not only limits the scope of
what can and cannot be reported but also makes almost
32
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invisible the positions, views and voices from the opposition
and from those outside the polarized spectrum. In doing so,
this framework erases the spaces for opposite and alternative
views, thus reinforcing polarization and its violent
manifestations.
The problems of an explicitly biased coverage (such as
democratic deficit) are overwhelmingly eclipsed by the
ability to turn segmented audiences into commodities.
Hence, pro-left and anti-left media saturate their narratives
with exaggerated versions of their own realities, which are
impossible to corroborate in a context of polarized politics
where one side of the society does not literally speak to the
other. In simple words, doing propaganda instead of
journalism tends to pay off in the short term for both sides.
In this context, polarization is not only the amalgamation of
complex views and voices in clear-cut but unrealistic
political blocks, but also a way to keep audiences captive of
elite interests. If indeed these interests do represent
distinctive understandings of society (social rights against
liberal rights), these are far from comprehensive and by no
means represent the realities and issues that news media and
journalists should be covering and disseminating. As each
side only speaks to those of their own kind, the consequence
is obvious; democratic debate and self-criticism ceases to
exist as such, and explicit violence inevitably follows.
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